Notably the graph based authentication schemes can operate in candidate for multimedia streaming authentication, in that i) two different modes -sender buffering mode and receiver buffering in the sender buffering mode, it allows elastic sending delay mode. In the former mode, packets are buffered at the sender side, required by multimedia streaming congestion control; ii) in waiting for the signature packet to be generated, which is the receiver buffering mode, it facilitates adaptation to subsequently sent first; in the latter mode, packets are generated oneffective network bandwidth; iii) it also has the potential to the-fly, but buffered at the receiver side, waiting for the signature provide unequal authentication protection (UAP), which is a packet to arrive and subsequently being verified. natural solution for multimedia codestream. Our analysis and
be seen as a special case of FLAG. In both cases, the construction structrue;flexible authentication graph manages to maximize the verification probability by avoiding authentication path overlapping. In addition, FLAG overcomes the Topic area-securityndmultimediastructure limitations of butterfly graph in that it allows flexible number of packets in one group sharing one signature. This property I. INTRODUCTION enables the elastic sending delay in the sender buffering mode, With the increasing demand on multimedia streaming in more making it suitable for multimedia streaming congestion control. and more applications, security issues such as integrity and Moreover, in the receiver buffering mode, since the authentication nonrepudiation are becoming increasingly important. Digital graph is not finalized during construction, FLAG allows controllable signature provides a natural solution to address such issues. However, hash links to be appended to packets, thus it is potentially adaptive to it is not practical to directly apply general signature scheme on each network conditions. Furthermore, the flexible construction of FLAG packet in a multimedia stream, due to the high computation also enables the potential to provide unequal authentication complexity and the communication overhead. Furthermore, in protection (UAP) [5] , which is a natural solution for protecting streaming authentication with time concern, there are two conflicting multimedia codestream. The UAP could be pursued by assigning requirements to be balanced -the sender delay and the receiver delay. different number of hash links to each packet according to its To address these problems, graph based authentication schemes [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] importance, similar to the work on JPEG2000 in [2] . are proposed. In authentication graph (AG), packets are connected as The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the directed acyclic graph (DAG) as shown in Fig 1. A node corresponds authentication path overlapping and characters of the layered to a packet and a directed edge corresponds to a hash link from its structure. A detailed description of FLAG is also given in this section.
source to its destination. Each packet has at least one directed path to Section 3 compares FLAG with two state-of-art algorithms EMSS the signature packet. At the receiver side, lost packets are dropped and butterfly graph. Section 4 draws the conclusions. from the graph and a packet is verifiable if it has a path to the signature packet. Therefore, a packet need more redundant path to be robust against loss, but this also increases the overhead.
Simple hash chain [1] has low communication overhead because II. FLEXIBLELAYEREDAUTHENTICATIONGRAPH each packet has its hash appended to previous packet and only one We concern two key points in this section when constructing an packet is signed. Any packet loss will break the chain and all authentication graph: 1) How to avoid ill-designed structure and 2) Fig. 1 . At the receiver, lost Signature packet is special among all the packets. If the signature packets are removed from the graph and a packet is unverifiable packet is lost, the whole segment is not verifiable. To verify the unless it has an authentication path. For example in Fig. 1 if packet stream packets, generally the signature packet has to be received, P5 is lost then P9 is unverifiable. Verification probability is defined as which can be realized by automatic repeat request (ARQ). the ratio of the number of received and authenticable packets over the Connecting all the stream packets to the signature packet is good for number of received packets, i.e. the authentication graph's robustness authentication purpose but it greatly increases the size of the against packet loss. The verification probability of a packet depends signature packet. In transmission data packet is further split into on the number of its authentication paths and its distance to the transmission units if its size exceeds the size of maximum signature packet S in each path. Generally more authentication paths transmission unit (MTU). For example, if the size of MTU is 1500 and shorter distance to S lead to higher authentication probability.
Bytes each. Since the first layer maximally contains m *k incoming hash with intra-layer hash links and inter-layer hash links. Consider the set links, the second layer should contain no more than m packets. Due of packets connected to the signature packet as the first layer, the set to the same reason all the packets in the latter layers should contain of packets that is not in the first layer but connected to a packet in the no more than m packets. Now consider a packet PI in the last layer L, first layer as the second layer. The process goes on till every packet is it has k outgoing hash links connected to k packets in layer L-1. Since assigned a layer. In such a layered view, there may be intra-layer there is no authentication path redundancy, these k packets altogether hash links and two kinds of inter-layer hash links that from former have k*k outgoing hash links connected to k*k packets in layer L-2, layer to latter layer (forward inter-layer hash link) and that from latter and so on. Thus in layer L-r the number of PI's authentication layer to former layer (backward inter-layer hash link). Because of the ancestors is kr, especially in the first layer it is k-L. Since . We also denote the FLAG algorithm Fig. 3 gives an example, where k increases to 3 number of outgoing hash links of Pj as H [Pj] . Each packet has an when processing P8 and keeping m, N fixed. In the receiver buffering authentication descendance set (denoted as D [Pj] ) containing the mode, since the authentication graph is not finalized till the signature index of its all authentication descendances. The process of the packet is sent out, the structure of FLAG can be changed during the FLAG algorithm is: transmission process and thus it facilitates adaptation to channel
Step 0: Initialize D[Pj] of all the packets as empty.
bandwidth.
Step 1: Sequentially apply following process for the packets Repeat the process for PRj until the outgoing hash links of PRJ reaches kRj.
Step 2: Repeat step 1 for layer R-1 and go on until the packets in the 2nd layer are all processed.
Step 3. Connect the packets in the first layer P1,1,.lPim to the signature packet using hash links. FLAG allows elastic sending delay which is required by multimedia streaming congestion control.
As an example, a layered authentication graph is shown in Fig. 2 , Fig. 3 . Layered authentication graph with m=5 and N 15. with m=5, k=2 (same for all packets) and N=15.
III. EXPERIMENTS
In this section we compare the FLAG with EMSS and butterfly graph, which are among the best performing authentication graphs.
12 ;--11 -(14 12; FLAG provides a more generic graph structure, where butterfly can F10,4,i f 10,I; 14 4 1411 j)1X7t ;3 t'l 2 10;1t Layeg)t;r k are shown in the legend. For EMSS, we randomly connect a packet Pj to two other packets in the range of Pj-l, .1, Pi128. packet is 2 and the number of packets per layer is 128 for both FLAG There is an interesting property when the hash capacity and and EMSS, FLAG obviously outperforms EMSS, especially when outgoing hash links are the same for all the packets. The algorithm the packet loss rate is high. FLAG generates a graph that is generates such a well distributed hash links between layer L and layer isomorphic to the butterfly graph when m is 2's power and k=2, their L-1 that they can be directly copied to other layers, as long as (1) is performance is indiscriminative in this case. Since in this situation (1) valid, and hence it has lower complexity to construct the graph. The is valid, the path overlapping-free graph exists and there is no
In the original proposal of EMSS the algorithm requires a minimal number of hash links of 2. Fig. 5 In this subsection we compare the authentication probability of FLAG and EMSS under different communication overhead, which is represented as the average number of incoming hash links per packet.
